Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 4

7-1-1985

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The recent opening up of communications with the planet Jupiter has given earth-bound philosophers an exciting opportunity to see how philosophy looks from the other side of the solar system, so to speak. Of course, many of us have hardly gone so far as to look at philosophy from the other side of our own planet—in Buddhist philosophy, for example. Still, there may be something useful in seeing some old problems treated in a new key.

Philosophy has had a long tradition on Jupiter, much longer than on Earth. But—maybe because of the massive gravitational field of that gigantic planet—things seem to go much more slowly there, and it's not all that much further ahead. Jovian philosophical developments over the past 1,000 earth-years, for example, are commonly referred to as "contemporary philosophy."

Much Jovian philosophy seems to have grown out of reflection on pre-philosophical modes of life and thought, just as terrestrial philosophy of religion, for example, grows out of reflection on religious practice and belief. There may well be a rich and profound Jovian religious life, but I think we have not yet learned of it. The widespread Jovian practice of *admiration*, for example, strikes me as proto-religious, or post-religious, or perhaps para-religious, but not really and fully religious. Nevertheless, it has given rise to interesting speculation.

One of the more widespread Jovian "cults" of admiration is that of *lithomiration*, the admiration of stones. There are a lot of stones on Jupiter, and ceremonies of lithomiration can be, and are, conducted almost everywhere. But the planetary center of lithomiration is in the Hamartic valley, just north of the equator. In the middle of that valley there rises an enormous granite monolith—The Stone—estimated to be over 1,000 times the volume of the Yosemite Valley's famed El Capitan. The high point of the lithomiric year comes at dawn of the summer solstice when the first rays of light catch the topmost crags of The Stone and tens of thousands of admirers rise ponderously with a mighty shout. Most lithomiricists hope to visit the Hamartic valley for this ceremony at least once in their lives.

Just what do lithomiricists admire? The least sophisticated admirers seem to direct their attention and interest straight-forwardly to The Stone, which they sometimes also call "Lithos." More sophisticated admirers smile tolerantly about

this, and say that the real object of admiration is not that huge granite block in the Hamartic valley, a stone which is no doubt slowly eroding in the harsh Jovian sandstorms. It is rather something which The Stone symbolizes, the transcendent stone which lies behind or beyond all planetary stones, and from which all stoniness derives. That, they say, is the true and everlasting stone, which is worthy of admiration. And it is that true and transcendent stone which is the real object wherever there is genuine admiration, and this is the object for which the high and noble name "Lithos" should be reserved.

(Some of these sophisticated lithomiricists cannot refrain from trying to explain just where Lithos is located. So they say (severally) that it is nowhere, or everywhere, or perhaps both. This has given rise to many puzzles.)

There is also a long tradition of lithology, even longer than that of philosophy. Lithologians have given much time and effort to identifying and explaining the stone-like attributes of Lithos. (Some of them, however, say that Lithos does not have so much as a single property in common with planetary stones, even The Stone. At most, they say, some of Lithos' properties are merely analogous to the properties of stones. This, too, has given rise to puzzles.)

One of Lithos' most interesting attributes appears in the basic lithomiric literature, and other pre-philosophical texts, as the property of *stability*. Here the accounts are fairly straightforward. Lithos is solid, weighty, well-settled. It stays in its place. It is not blown about by the wind. Excavators do not topple it. Jupiter-quakes do not displace it, and even the collisions of stars do not shake it.

Over many thousands of years, however, this property has been refined and polished philosophically. An important move, early on, largely replaced the categorical notion of stability with its modalized analogue, *immobility*. Not merely is Lithos unmoved, etc. Now it is said that it *cannot* be moved, it is *not possible* to move it. The doctrine has thus expanded to cover not only what is but also what could be.

A second crucial step was taken in the great Middle Period of Jovian philosophy, six or seven thousand years ago. An extremely influential philosophical lithologian proposed that the doctrine of lithic immobility should be understood to say that Lithos remained unmoved in all circumstances, either actual or possible, *in which it was logically possible to remain unmoved*. On the surface, at least, this move seemed to contract the scope of the doctrine. It seemed to suggest that perhaps Lithos could be moved after all, if the circumstances made stability logically impossible. The distinguished lithologian, however, hotly rejected this charge of watering down the doctrine of immobility. Logical absurdity, he said, was in no way a type of stability. If anything, it expresses a radical instability, unworthy of admiration. It is therefore completely inappropriate to something like Lithos. It would be unreasonable, he said, to demand that the doctrine of lithic immobility (or any other lithological doctrine) should be interpreted so as

to make Lithos either be or do a logical impossibility.

This proposal has dominated speculation about lithic immobility right down to the present. There have, however, been a few distinguished dissidents. They have said that those who really admired Lithos and took seriously the idea of immobility would ascribe to Lithos the deepest and most radical form of that property. That would be a stability which would be victorious not only over every force, actual and possible, but over logic itself. Lithos stands firm, they said, *even if it is logically impossible to remain unmoved.* For Lithos also transcends logic.

This is, of course, a dark doctrine, and it has attracted few defenders. I will mention it only once more, and briefly.

There has been a recent spate of renewed Jovian interest in speculation about immobility. In these discussions several Jovian philosophers have used, *simply as a heuristic strategy*, the assumption that there is, or may be, another being which they call "O." And O's most relevant property is that of *omnimotility*, the power of moving anything. One can then ask whether it is possible that both Lithos and O exist, what happens when omnimotility collides with immobility, and so on. And these speculations are used to explore the logical features of the concept of lithic immobility.

Although omnimotility was originally explained simply as the power of moving anything, it was quickly realized that an explicitly modalized version was more interesting. So now this is generally understood as the power to move any *possible* object. Omnimotility, like immobility, covers not only what is but also what could be.

Some of the recent discussions make use also of a new way of talking about possibility and actuality, a terminology which has become popular among Jovian philosophers in the last two or three hundred earth-years. Complete states of affairs which are logically possible are spoken of as "possible jupiters." That state of affairs which actually obtains is, of course, the actual jupiter. The claim that something possibly exists can be put by saying that it exists in some possible jupiter. If it actually exists, it exists in the actual jupiter. That two things are compossible becomes the claim that there is some possible jupiter in which both of them exist. And (in the way in which I use it here) the claim that two *properties* are compossible is the claim that there is some possible jupiter in which they are both exemplified (not necessarily by the same thing).

Using both the older and the newer terminology, we can summarize the most interesting options which have been explored. Many lithologians hold that Lithos has necessary existence, i.e., that it exists in every possible jupiter. Others, slightly more cautious, say that if Lithos exists at all then it has necessary existence, i.e., that if it exists in any possible jupiter then it exists in every possible jupiter. And this presumably means that if Lithos is possible, then it is

actual. Some, however, hold a third opinion, and that is that Lithos is a contingent object, one which exists in some possible jupiters, but not in all.

With respect to the property of immobility, some hold that this is an essential property of Lithos, i.e., a property which Lithos could not possibly lack. In the language of possible jupiters, Lithos is immobile in every possible jupiter in which it exists. Others, however, maintain that immobility is an accidental property of Lithos, one whose lack would not be fatal to the existence or identity of Lithos. There would thus be some possible jupiters in which Lithos exists but is not immobile.

Since O is primarily a heuristic device in these discussions, a stipulated and hypothetical entity, it would seem that it could also be thought of (or specified) in any of these ways. Abstractly, then, there are quite a few combinations to be considered.

Many of these, however, seem to yield the same result, so the number can be quickly reduced. It has seemed obvious to many Jovian philosophers, for example, that omnimotility and immobility are not compossible. There is no possible jupiter in which there exists *both* an immobile object *and* an omnimotile agent. For either immobility would triumph, and therefore omnimotility would perish, or *vice versa*. If Lithos has necessary existence, therefore, and has immobility as an essential property, then it excludes an omnimotile agent from every possible jupiter. In that case, O exists in a possible jupiter (i.e., is a possible existent) only if omnimotility is not essential to O.

If on the other hand, Lithos is an impossible entity, then there is no possible jupiter in which there is an immobile object. (This assumes that Lithos is the only candidate for immobility.) There would be then no apparent barrier to the existence of O. In that case, O is a possible existent.

If Lithos is contingent, or an entity for which immobility is accidental, then there are possible jupiters in which an immobile object exists and others in which there is no such object. If O is contingent, or if omnimotility is not essential to O, then O can be fitted into some jupiter in which it will not collide with Lithos. So O is possible.

But if O is an entity which exists in every jupiter if it exists in any (i.e., O necessarily exists if it is possible), and if omnimotility is essential to it, then it seems to collide logically with even a contingent Lithos. If it is even possible that Lithos exists and is immobile, then O is impossible.

These arguments have seemed fairly convincing to many, but they are far from being universally accepted. A few—those who hold that Lithos transcends logic—say that, for all we know, both Lithos and O may be actualities, along with their interesting properties. Though they have properties which are not logically compossible, they may nevertheless both exist, because logical impossibility is not a barrier to Lithos. But, as I have said, this is a dark doctrine. I

can say no more about it here.

Others, however, have challenged the claim that immobility and omnimotility are logically incompossible. Relying on the interpretation which has come down from the Middle Period, they observe that immobility extends only to what is logically possible. But it is not logically possible for a thing to remain unmoved if it is subjected to a power which is sufficient for moving anything. Since O, by stipulation, has the power of omnimotility, if O exists then absolute stability is not logically possible. If O exists, then, Lithos will indeed be movable *by O*. But because of the rider referring to what is logically possible, that fact will not in any way damage Lithos' immobility. And, of course, Lithos will continue to be unmoved by tornadoes, jupiter-quakes, and so on. No reasonable philosopher, it is said, could expect more from the concept of immobility.

In any possible jupiter, then, in which Lithos exists and O does not, Lithos is absolutely unmoved. In those jupiters in which both O and Lithos exist, Lithos may be moved, but only by O. Thus, one might say, the burden of adjusting to the friction between immobility and omnimotility falls on Lithos.

There have recently been a few Jovian philosophers who have been asking why the burden should be assumed to fall in that way. Why, they ask, should we not apply the same level of sophistication to the concept of omnimotility? Why, that is, should we not construe this property as the power of moving anything *which it is logically possible to move*? Construed in this way, it does not require that a being which possesses it be able to perform the logically absurd task of moving something which cannot possibly be moved. On this interpretation, O would indeed be incapable of moving Lithos, since Lithos is immobile, but this would be no damage to the omnimotility of O.

In other words, we could say that in those possible jupiters in which O exists, and Lithos does not, everything is movable by O. In those jupiters, however, in which they both exist Lithos remains unmoved by O. But no reasonable philosopher could demand that O, in order to have the power of omnimotility, should be able to move everything even in those possible jupiters in which there exist things which cannot possibly be moved. On this interpretation, then, the burden of adjusting to the friction between immobility and omnimotility falls on O rather than on Lithos.

In part, the difference between this approach and the previous one seems to be one of *where* one adopts a "sophisticated" analysis of a radical property. Notions like immobility and omnimotility initially invite interpretation simply in terms of everything, nothing, etc. Then one thinks of adding to one of these the rider, *which is logically possible*. Thus we get what might be called a "qualified" version of the property. If one of these concepts is understood in this sophisticated way, while the other remains in its cruder (and original) form, then it is the sophisticated concept which gives way before the cruder one.

If both concepts are construed in the sophisticated way, however, we seem to fall into a peculiar impasse. If attaching the possibility rider to one property makes them compossible, then it certainly seems that they should be compossible if they both carry that rider. But in this case there seems to be nothing to indicate which is the property which "gives way," the one which bears the burden of adjusting to the other. And yet, we think, there must be some answer to that question. There must be some fact of the matter.

For suppose that both O and Lithos exist in the actual jupiter. And suppose, too, that the concepts of immobility and omnimotility are both restricted to what is logically possible. What actually happens, then? Does Lithos remain unmoved, even in the face of O's power? Perhaps so, since that apparently would do no damage to O's omnimotility. Or is it, on the other hand, that O moves *everything*, despite Lithos' immobility? That would not damage Lithos' immobility, so it too seems an option. But which one actually happens? It seems as though one of these must happen, and they cannot both happen. The crucial properties themselves do not seem to determine which one happens. But if these properties do not determine what happens, then what on jupiter does?

One Jovian philosopher has recently claimed that the plausible sounding assumption which we made above is mistaken. He argues that if both properties are unqualified, then they are incompossible. If one—it does not matter which one—is qualified, then they are compossible. But, curiously, if both are qualified, then they are again incompossible. For, he says, assume (*per impossible*) that both Lithos and O exist in the actual jupiter, both with their interesting qualified properties. Now, either it is logically possible for Lithos to remain unmoved in the face of O's power, or it is not possible. And, if it is possible, then Lithos *must* remain unmoved, or else it cannot have even the qualified version of immobility.

But, he argues, immobility and omnimotility are qualified in exactly the same way. There must, therefore, be a strict logical parity between them. And so, if it is possible for Lithos to remain absolutely unmoved in the face of O's power it must also be possible for O to move absolutely everything, in the face of Lithos' stability. But then O *must* move everything, to retain even the qualified version of omnimotility.

Beginning then with the qualified properties, plus the assumption that it is possible for Lithos to remain unmoved, we conclude that Lithos remains absolutely unmoved and that O moves absolutely everything. But that is a *reductio*.

If we begin with the other assumption, that it is not possible for Lithos to remain unmoved, the parity principle yields the conclusion that it is not possible for O to move everything. But there is no candidate for complete stability other than Lithos, and no candidate for the mover of Lithos other than O. So again we seem to have a *reductio*. And so this philosopher concludes that the qualified

versions of these properties are logically imcompossible.

This puzzling line of argument seems to be related to the earlier problem of determining which property gives way when both of them are qualified. The conclusion of the argument strikes many Jovians as counter-intuitive, and they are inclined to regard it as sophistical. But no clear and persuasive refutation of it has yet emerged.

This rather unsatisfactory position seems to represent the state of the question at the present time. A few Jovians have recently been suggesting, with some hesitation, that perhaps the trouble is that the notion of logical possibility is not as clear as it has seemed. They are becoming suspicious of what might be called "free floating possibilities," possibilities which seem to be independent of any concrete realities. Instead, they say, it may be that possibilities must in some way grow out of actualities, so that *what is* has a logical priority, or some sort of priority, over *what could be*. If that is so, then there might be a metaphysical, rather than a logical, solution of the difficulty. If, that is, O were metaphysically "deeper" in the structure of reality than Lithos, then it is Lithos that would give way. If Lithos were deeper, then O would bear the burden of adjusting. But this theory has not been worked out in convincing detail. It is mostly a step yet to be taken in Jovian philosophy.

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